Hansard debates

Sonya KILKENNY (Carrum – Attorney-General, Minister for Planning, Minister for Prevention of Family Violence) (11:19): Under the Statewide Treaty Act 2025, I table a statement of treaty compatibility:

1. In my opinion, the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Coercive Control, Good Character, Risk Assessment and Other Matters) Bill 2026 (the Bill) is compatible with the matters set out in section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025 (Treaty Act). I base my opinion on the reasons outlined in this statement.

Overview of the Bill

2. The Bill introduces a package of legislative reforms that are intended to improve legal and justice system responses to family and sexual violence and prioritise the safety of victim-survivors. In particular, the Bill will:

2.1 amend the Crimes Act 1958 to introduce an offence of coercive control

2.2 amend the Sentencing Act 1991 and Youth Justice Act 2024 (YJ Act) to abolish the concept of ‘good character’ at sentencing (including its use as a mitigating factor) for all offences, and all offenders

2.3 amend the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (FVPA) to:

a. introduce an own motion power for sentencing courts hearing criminal proceedings to extend or vary a family violence intervention order (FVIO)

b. introduce a police application process that requires police to indicate whether there is a current FVIO on the charge sheet and if an extension or variation application will be made

c. provide considerations for the court when it is determining an application to extend an FVIO and introduce a default length of extension when the respondent is serving a term of imprisonment

d. clarify that electronic signatures are permissible for documents required to be signed under the FVPA

e. promote timely responses to information sharing requests under the Family Violence Information Sharing Scheme (FVISS), to more effectively manage family violence risk, and to clarify the purposes for which information can be shared

f. introduce a new approach to Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management (MARAM) Framework annual reporting processes focused on more efficient, meaningful and transparent reporting

2.4 amend the Personal Safety Intervention Orders Act 2010 (PSIOA) to expand the definition of ‘prohibited behaviour’ to include grooming, and to clarify that electronic signatures are permissible for documents required to be signed under the PSIOA

2.5 amend the Infringements Act 2006, Fines Reform Act 2014, and Road Safety Act 1986 to:

a. expand work and development permit scheme (WDPS) to include court fines, and

b. expand the family violence scheme (FVS) to include fines issued for excessive speed infringements detected by camera where the victim-survivor was not the driver, and

2.6 amend the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (EO Act) to insert a new attribute of ‘subjection to family violence’ that would prohibit discrimination against a person in areas of public life on the basis of that person having been or being subjected to family violence.

Consultation with the First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl

3. The First Peoples’ Assembly of Gellung Warl (Assembly) was provided with information regarding the Bill and an opportunity to advise on the Bill in June 2026. In July 2026, the Assembly accepted a briefing on the Bill in which information was provided on the Bill and its impacts on First Peoples. I note that, respecting Cabinet processes, the Bill itself was not provided during this briefing. Following this briefing the Assembly provided a representation as follows:

3.1 The First Peoples’ Assembly was not provided with a copy of the Bill. The Assembly understands that extensive feedback was provided by First Peoples experts and organisations to the State and that several substantive concerns have not been addressed. The Assembly expects ongoing engagement with First Peoples experts and organisations throughout the implementation of the reforms, including consideration of any further legislative or policy changes and appropriate safeguarding mechanisms.

4. I note that the Assembly was notified of the EO Act reforms separately and provided with information on the Bill in July 2026.

5. I note that, as highlighted through engagement with First Peoples experts and organisations, the Bill may have a disproportionate impact on First Peoples. As detailed in the compatibility assessment below, these concerns have been considered and the Bill has been adapted to include some measures and safeguards in response to these concerns. However, I acknowledge that not all aspects of the Bill align with the concerns raised regarding its potential impacts on First Peoples. I note that the State will continue to work with First Peoples in the implementation of these reforms, and any related policy changes.

Compatibility of the Bill with each of the objects in section 66(3)(d) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025

6. I have considered whether the Bill is compatible with the objects at section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act:

6.1. advancing the inherent rights and self‑determination of First Peoples

6.2. addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation, and

6.3. ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

Introduction of an offence of coercive control

7. I note that the coercive control offence introduced by this Bill does not apply specifically to First Peoples, as it creates an offence that applies equally to any adult. However, it may, in its practical effects, engage the objects at section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act in light of the significant overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

8. I acknowledge that the exercise of the right to self-determination will necessarily be limited by the criminal justice system, given the loss of liberty inherent in aspects of policing, court processes and the conditions of custody. However, particular consideration has been given to whether this offence further affects the right to self-determination.

9. While the government seeks to enable self-determination rights in the justice system where possible, for example through the operation of Koori Courts and by supporting Aboriginal programs and access to culture in prisons settings, the nature of criminal offences (when individuals are charged, prosecuted and sentenced) and broader policing, judicial and custodial systems are not self-determined. As the Bill only introduces an additional offence within these broader system settings, these amendments do not affect the self-determination of First Peoples.

10. To the extent that the offence introduced by this Bill may lead to increased overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system and in custody, this may affect some inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the United Nations Declaration into the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

11. The offence of coercive control introduced by this Bill may indirectly limit the right to culture (article 11) noting the significant disruption that imprisonment presents to access to Country (see also articles 25 and 26) and places of spiritual significance, cultural practices and cultural connections, including kinship networks. Increased contact with the criminal justice system and/or a term of imprisonment may also limit the right to improvement of economic and social conditions (article 5) and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24).

12. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the introduction of the offence of coercive control is nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

13. To the extent that the offence of coercive control introduced by this Bill may lead to increased contact with the justice system and incarceration of First Peoples, it may compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation.

14. The Yoorrook Justice Commission’s Yoorrook for Justice report notes the significant overrepresentation of First Peoples in the justice system and the subsequent impacts on First Peoples including:

14.1. the disproportionate rate at which Aboriginal women are victim-survivors of family violence

14.2. the frequent misidentification of Aboriginal women as the predominant aggressor by police, which places them at greater risk of further violence and criminalisation, while leading to a profound sense of distrust in the police and legal system, and

14.3. the significant disruptions to family and the community when people face increased contact with the criminal justice system and/or are imprisoned.

15. Misidentification can occur in a range of circumstances, including where the victim-survivor’s presentation and characteristics are misinterpreted, or they use retaliatory force to protect themselves or another person from family violence. Certain groups of people are more at risk of being misidentified, including First Peoples, and particularly women.

16. The Yoorrook Justice Commission’s Truth be Told report noted that Aboriginal women are more likely to experience family violence than non-Aboriginal women and yet, Aboriginal women in Victoria are also the fastest growing prison demographic. The report noted that First Peoples are over-policed as people who use violence, but simultaneously under-supported by police as affected family members in need of protection.

17. Regarding the overrepresentation of First Peoples in prison, Yoorrook for Justice also notes that ‘removing them from their community can have devastating effects on their personal and social wellbeing, with many families experiencing ongoing trauma and grief as a result’. Disproportionate rates of imprisonment compound the unacceptable disadvantage of First Peoples which can have profound, far-reaching and intergenerational impacts.

18. The report also found that the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system was in part driven by a ‘pattern of systemically racist policing’ noting that while this ‘does not characterise the whole of policing in Victoria, it is widespread and ingrained’. In this context, I note that the introduction of this offence creates a further risk of over policing and criminalisation of First Peoples, both as a result of misidentification of the primary aggressor, as well as in the general application of the offence. In particular, given the complexity and long-term nature of investigating and demonstrating behaviours regarding this offence, I note that there is a risk of First Peoples being subject to sustained contact with police as victim-survivors, broader family members and those accused of the offence. I acknowledge that even where this does not result in conviction, this contact with the criminal justice system can result in harmful social, economic and health effects.

19. I note that the proposed maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment for the new coercive control offence, may lead to more custodial sentences both generally and specifically for First Peoples due to their overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. While courts will continue to have the full range of options for sentencing offenders, including non-custodial options, I acknowledge that this Bill does not address, and may compound, the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation given the profound impacts of overrepresentation of First Peoples in the justice system and imprisonment.

20. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the Bill is nevertheless compatible with the object of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

21. While the Bill applies to any adult who engages in coercive control of an intimate partner, I acknowledge that the Bill may, in its practical effects, limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples. I consider that the Bill may engage human rights, including the rights to liberty (section 21, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the Charter)), freedom of movement (section 12), right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16) the protection of families and children (section 16) and the right to property (section 20). As noted above, the Bill may also engage First Peoples’ inherent rights, particularly the rights to culture, country, improvement of economic and social conditions and enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

22. To the extent that First Peoples are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and may therefore be overrepresented in those charged with the new offence of coercive control, First Peoples’ equal enjoyment of these rights may be limited. These limitations may occur as a result of increased contact with police, being remanded and/or a possible sentence of imprisonment, which requires the deprivation of liberty and the exercise of powers held by officers in charge of custodial facilities. The family unit may also be affected when an intimate partner is investigated for this offence and/or made subject to an imprisonment order. This is a particularly acute and sensitive issue in the context of this offence, where the imprisonment is a result of family violence. In circumstances where First Peoples are subject to disproportionate criminalisation and detention, this may limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

23. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion the Bill is nevertheless compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of preventing this offending conduct and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

24. While the new offence may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act as outlined above, in my opinion it is not incompatible with them having regard to the following matters:

24.1. the new offence applies to any adult who engages in coercive control of an intimate partner, not specifically or only First Peoples

24.2. the new offence denounces and criminally recognises behaviours that extend to a pattern of ongoing, continuous abuse used by a person to control and coerce an intimate partner, which can have a significant impact on victim-survivors and the community, including First Peoples women and children. Whilst the offence may lead to more custodial sentences, the maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment is appropriate given the insidious and damaging impact of coercive control

24.3. the scope of the new offence is limited to the extent that it only applies to adults, who must intend to coerce or control an intimate partner by engaging in the conduct, and does not apply to other relationships. This limits the risk of misidentification of the primary aggressor, which disproportionately impacts First Peoples victim-survivors, and limits the risk of increased criminalisation and incarceration of First Peoples more broadly, while addressing the key context in which coercive control occurs – in intimate partner relationships. Further, the courts will retain discretion to sentence offenders according to their relevant culpability, including imposing non-custodial sentences if appropriate

24.4. to the extent that misidentification of the primary aggressor is disproportionately experienced by First Peoples women, the Bill includes important safeguards to minimise the risks of misidentification, including a defence that the course of conduct alleged to constitute coercive control was reasonable in the context of the relationship as a whole. This defence can be raised by the misidentified person where relevant and allows for consideration of the broader context in which the alleged offending occurred

24.5. the elements of the offence also incorporate protections against misidentification including the requirements that an accused engaged in relevant conduct, that this conduct must be part of a course of conduct (that is, conduct that is protracted or occurs on more than one occasion), the course of conduct must show a continuity of purpose towards the victim and both intentional fault and objective fault elements – that the accused intends to coerce or control the victim by engaging in the course of conduct and ought to understand, in the particular circumstances, that the course of conduct will probably cause harm, and

24.6. noting the complexity of this offence and the need for carefully considered implementation and monitoring, the offence will be supported by a statutory review requirement and longer commencement timeframes for implementation, which will allow for training for key workforces, broad-based awareness building and targeted education campaigns, and structured and resourced pathways to support services, including culturally appropriate support services for First Peoples.

25. For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the introduction of the offence of coercive control is compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Abolishing the concept of ‘good character’ (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing for all offences and introducing procedural requirements for written references

26. I note that the ‘good character’ reforms in the Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples, as they abolish the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing for all adults and children.

27. However, these reforms may, in their practical effects, engage with the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i)–‍(iii) of the Treaty Act in light of the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system. For example, I note that First Peoples represent less than 2 per cent of the Victorian population but in 2025 made up 14 per cent of alleged offenders proceeded against by police via arrest or summons as a result of alleged offender incidents.

28. The reforms abolish the concept of good character at sentencing for all offences, so that it can no longer be relied on as a reason that may reduce a sentence. There is therefore a risk the reform could lead to increased rates and/or lengths of custodial sentences for both children and adults, which has a risk of further increasing First Peoples’ overrepresentation in custody.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

29. I acknowledge that the exercise of the right to self-determination will necessarily be limited by the criminal justice system, for the same reasons detailed above regarding the introduction of the offence of coercive control. However, the good character reforms do not, in their terms or in their practical effects, further affect First Peoples’ self-determination.

30. To the extent that abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing may lead to increased overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system and in custody, this may impact some inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in UNDRIP.

31. The good character reforms may, in practice, limit the right to culture (article 11) noting the significant disruption that imprisonment presents to access to Country (see also articles 25 and 26) and places of spiritual significance, cultural practices and cultural connections, including kinship networks. A term of imprisonment may also limit the right to improvement of economic and social conditions (article 5) and the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24).

32. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of removing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating sentencing factor) at sentencing and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

33. To the extent that abolishing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating factor) at sentencing may lead to increased custodial sentences for First Peoples, the reforms may also compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation and limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples.

34. The Charter rights likely to be engaged include the rights to liberty (section 21), freedom of movement (section 12), right to privacy (section 13(a)), the rights to practice religion and enjoy cultural rights (sections 14(1)(b) and 19), freedom of expression (section 15(2)), right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16), right to protection of families and children (section 17) and the right to property (section 20). These rights may be limited due to a possible increase in custodial sentences, which requires the deprivation of liberty.

35. The Yoorrook for Justice report considered the significant impact of First Peoples’ over-representation in the justice system, including the disruptions to family and the community when people are imprisoned. The report notes that ‘[r]emoving them from their community can have devastating effects on their personal and social wellbeing, with many families experiencing ongoing trauma and grief as a result’.

36. The Yoorrook for Justice report also notes that First Peoples are estimated to be at least two to five times more likely to experience violence than non-Aboriginal people. As outlined above, good character is not an appropriate reason to mitigate a sentence given it is based on a vague and subjective concept that cannot predict risks of re-offending or prospects of rehabilitation, and using and referring to good character in mitigation of sentence is harmful and may be re-traumatising for victim-survivors.

37. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the objects of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of removing the concept of good character (including its use as a mitigating sentencing factor) at sentencing and the nature of the impacts on these Treaty objects, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

38. For the reasons set out above, these reforms may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act. However, in my opinion, the reforms are a proportionate means of achieving the policy purposes of helping ensure fairer sentencing outcomes and improving victims’ experience of the justice system, and are therefore compatible with those objects, noting:

38.1. the good character reforms universally apply to any person who is sentenced for an offence, not specifically or only to First Peoples

38.2. good character is not an appropriate reason to mitigate a sentence given it is based on a vague and subjective concept that cannot predict risks of re-offending or prospects of rehabilitation. It may perpetuate inequality and systemic disadvantage as there is unequal access to the benefits of good character as a mitigating factor given it can be more readily available to certain groups (who have social status and means) than others, including First Peoples. In addition, using and referring to good character in mitigation of sentence is harmful and may be re-traumatising for victims, particularly as First Peoples are disproportionately represented as victim-survivors

38.3. courts will not be prevented from considering an individual’s lack of prior convictions and information about their circumstances and characteristics if it relates to another sentencing consideration. For example, this could include information relating to an individual’s connection to community, culture or Country where such information helps a court assess prospects of rehabilitation or risk of reoffending. When sentencing children, this includes the YJ Act sentencing principles and the requirement to prioritise the rehabilitation and positive development of children, as well as the specific sentencing principles for Aboriginal children

38.4. the reforms will also introduce procedural requirements for written references to ensure that courts receive appropriate information about an offender that is relevant to a sentencing consideration, and

38.5. delayed commencement of the reforms will allow stakeholders to conduct training and update practice guides as appropriate to implement the reforms effectively and without unintended impacts on First Peoples, victim-survivors, offenders, the judiciary and legal practitioners.

39. For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the good character reforms in the Bill are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Family violence and personal safety reforms

40. I note that the family violence and personal safety reforms introduced by this Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples, nor is it expected that most aspects of these reforms will, in practice, affect the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

41. However, it is expected that the new power for criminal courts hearing a criminal proceeding to extend or vary an FVIO on their own motion, without requiring an application to be filed or requiring a separate proceeding (own motion power), may engage with the objects in sections 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act, as detailed below.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

42. To the extent that the own motion power may have an impact on First Peoples right to autonomy and self-government, this may impact some inherent rights, including the right to self-determination, as outlined in the UNDRIP.

43. The Bill may, in practice, limit the right to decision-making and consent (articles 18 and 19), noting the own motion power allows a court hearing a criminal proceeding to extend or vary an FVIO on their own motion. This may also have a limiting effect on the right to improvement of social conditions (article 21) and the right to culture (article 11), given that matters relating to family and intimate relationships involving First Peoples may be more appropriately addressed through First Peoples laws, customs and community-led responses.

44. However, I note that the own motion power can only be exercised with consent of the protected person and may also be exercised by Koori Courts hearing a related family violence offence, which may offer a more culturally sensitive way for FVIO extensions or variations to be considered.

45. With regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples due to the importance of preventing family violence and protecting victim-survivors, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

46. To the extent that the own motion power reform may exacerbate the risk of First Peoples being misidentified as the predominant aggressor in family violence cases, there is a risk that this may compound the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation. Accordingly, the risks of misidentification discussed above in the section on the introduction of the coercive control offence are also relevant to these reforms.

47. For First Peoples who have been misidentified, the own motion power could further reinforce and prolong the consequences of that misidentification, which can disrupt family and community connections and create barriers to employment, housing and cultural participation.

48. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation due to the importance of preventing and protecting against family violence and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

49. While the Bill applies to all those experiencing family violence, I acknowledge that the Bill may limit the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of First Peoples, due to the risks associated with misidentification described above and how this may lead to criminalisation. I consider that the Bill may, in its practical effects, engage human rights, including Charter rights to a fair hearing (section 24) and the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (section 25). As noted above, the Bill may also engage First Peoples’ inherent rights, particularly the rights to decision-making and consent.

50. These rights may be limited because First Peoples who have been misidentified as the predominant aggressor may experience increased police involvement and criminal charges for alleged FVIO breaches, all in circumstances where the original allegations of family violence have not been properly examined. This can weaken the practical effect of being presumed innocent and undermine the right to a fair hearing. It may also be a contributing factor to the overrepresentation of First Peoples in the criminal justice system, both due to misidentification and due to the overall effects of extensions and variations of FVIOs through the own motion power.

51. In addition, if the own motion power is exercised with First Peoples respondents, this may also have a direct impact on Charter rights such as freedom of movement (section 12) and freedom of association (section 16). For example, the own motion power could vary the FVIO to include conditions that restrict a respondent from contacting or being within a certain distance of the protected person. These restrictions would directly impact the respondents’ ability to move freely around the State and associate with certain people.

52. However, with regard to the above considerations, in my opinion these reforms are nevertheless compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples due to the importance of preventing and protecting against family violence, including First Peoples victim-survivors, and and the nature of the impacts on this Treaty object, as detailed in the proportionality assessment below.

Proportionality assessment

53. While the own motion power may limit the achievement of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act as outlined above, in my opinion the limitations are proportionate and therefore compatible with these objects. In particular, I note that:

53.1. the Bill universally applies to those experiencing family violence where the own motion power may be available

53.2. there is a significant public interest in preventing family violence and protecting victim-survivors from further family violence, particularly noting the disproportionate rates of family violence experienced by First Peoples victim-survivors

53.3. the Bill complements the reforms in the Justice Legislation Amendment (Family Violence, Stalking and Other Matters) Act 2026, which will commence no later than 10 November 2026, and will require police and courts to consider misidentification factors when considering whether to issue a family violence safety notice, or when making an interim or final FVIO. Although misidentification that pre-dates these reforms may persist, the reforms will reduce the risk of misidentification in the making of new orders, thereby reducing the risk of misidentification in the own motion power context

53.4. the Bill includes important safeguards such as requiring a court to hear the views of a protected person before exercising the own motion power, which is intended to minimise any potential negative impacts on victim-survivors

53.5. the Bill similarly requires that the respondent has had the opportunity to be heard in respect of an extension or variation. This may provide an opportunity for the court to assess whether misidentification is a relevant issue and whether it may be inappropriate to exercise the own motion power, and

53.6. the Bill does not replace the existing civil application pathways to extend, vary or revoke an FVIO available to parties under the FVPA.

54. For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the own motion power under the family violence and personal safety reforms, and the reforms more broadly, are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act.

Family Violence Information Sharing Scheme (FVISS) and Family Violence Multi-Agency Risk Assessment and Management (MARAM) Framework reforms

55. I note that the amendments to the FVPA seek to clarify the existing responsibilities of prescribed organisations to share information and streamline reporting requirements. Amendments seeking to promote timely response to information sharing requests allow sufficient flexibility to ensure that Family Violence Specialist Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations, which may receive a higher volume of such requests, can define ‘timely’ in a way which best promotes the needs of their service users and organisations.

56. In light of the above, in my opinion, the MARAM and FVISS reforms in this Bill do not in their terms deal with First Peoples, nor is it expected that any aspects of the Bill will, in practice, have a differential effect on First Peoples.

57. Accordingly, in my opinion, the MARAM and FVISS reforms in this Bill do not affect the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act and are therefore compatible with each of those objects.

Fines and infringements reforms

58. I note that the reforms to the fines systems outlined in the Bill do not in their terms include any provisions which apply specifically to First Peoples. However, in their practical effects, in my opinion the reforms are likely to promote the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

59. In considering the compatibility of these reforms with section 66(3)(d) of the Treaty Act, I have considered the effects of the fines system on First Peoples. Although data specific to Victoria is not available, in its 2018 report Pathways to Justice, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) found that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were over-represented as fine recipients, less likely to pay a fine on time and, as a result, more likely to be subject to enforcement measures (ALRC Report 133, 2018), 387.

60. There is a lack of data to quantify the unequal impact of the Victorian fines system on First Peoples, but it is known that the system has the potential to impact adversely on people experiencing vulnerability and disadvantage. This is particularly relevant to First Peoples, noting the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples due to the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the fines system may have a disproportionate impact on First Peoples.

61. To address the potential disproportionate effects of the fines system on First Peoples in progressing any fines-related reforms, the government has regard to the importance of appropriate remedial and social justice mechanisms within the fines system. This requires a continuing focus on protecting and enhancing these measures to ensure the fines system is fair and flexible, so that people who cannot or should not pay due to a specified kind of vulnerability or disadvantage, are effectively diverted away from the criminal justice system or have options other than payment to expiate their fines.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

62. The reforms do not expressly advance the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples, as the Bill applies to all people who are fine recipients. However, the Bill is likely to support this object by broadening access to the Work and Development Permit Scheme (WDPS), which provides eligible individuals with a non-financial way to address their fine debt thereby reducing the risk of non-payment and enforcement measures.

63. There are 27 Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations delivering culturally appropriate activities to First Peoples who are fine recipients under the WDPS. This supports the inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the UNDRIP, particularly rights to self-determination (article 3), allowing Aboriginal Community Controlled Organisations to deliver the WDPS in ways that are tailored to local First Peoples’ communities and needs, and rights to culture (articles 11 and 12) and Country (articles 25 and 26), where WDPS activities include relevant cultural and on Country activities.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples and ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

64. I note that the reforms to expand the family violence scheme (FVS) for infringement fines to include some excessive speed infringements, and the amendments to expand the WDPS to include court fines are likely to promote the objects in section 66(3)(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Treaty Act to the extent that First Peoples may be more likely to access these schemes as a result of historic wrongs and ongoing injustice and are therefore more likely to benefit from the broadening of access to the schemes.

65. The following Charter rights may also be enlivened and supported by these reforms:

65.1. rights to freedom of movement (section 12) and to liberty and security of person (section 21(1)) – the broadening of access to the WDPS and FVS is likely to reduce the non-payment of fines by recipients who will now be eligible for the schemes, thereby reducing the risk of enforcement actions for unpaid fines, including the seizure of assets, and driver licence and vehicle registration sanctions, and

65.2. right to protection of families and children (section 17(1)) – expanding the FVS may reduce the impact of family violence on families who are victim-survivors, and support their capacity to subsist, as fines not previously eligible for the scheme may be withdrawn, and demerit points reversed under the expanded provisions.

66. The amendment to clarify that the Director, Fines Victoria’s power to deregister infringement fines does not apply to infringement offences that take effect as a deemed conviction will not (directly or indirectly) engage any of the objects in section 66(3)(d)(i)–(iii) of the Treaty Act because: the amendment is minor in nature in the context of the legislative scheme for fines; it is a clarification only to reflect that the deregistration power has never been used for deemed conviction infringements because the use of the power is problematic in the context of offences that take effect as a deemed conviction; and there are other pathways available for people experiencing vulnerability and disadvantage (including First Peoples) to deal with their fines.

67. Accordingly, in my opinion, the fines-related reforms in this Bill are compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act.

Adding family violence as protected attribute under the EO Act

68. I note that the reforms to the EO Act introduced by this Bill do not in their terms include any provisions that apply specifically to First Peoples. However, in their practical effects, in my opinion the reforms are likely to promote the objects at section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Treaty Act, noting the disproportionate impact of family violence on First Peoples. For example, I note that First Peoples represent less than two per cent of the Victorian population but in 2024–25 made up over six per cent of victim-survivors with Family Violence Intervention Orders. I further note that 60 per cent of First Peoples women in Australia have experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner since age 15.

Advancing the inherent rights and self-determination of First Peoples

69. I note that the reforms may indirectly affect the object at section 66(3)(d)(i) of the Treaty Act by advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples. Providing protection from discrimination for people subjected to family violence is expected to support the inherent rights of First Peoples as outlined in the UNDRIP, particularly the right to equality and freedom from discrimination (article 2) and subsequently the rights to the improvement of economic and social conditions (article 21), education (article 14) and the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 24) by providing protection from discrimination based on family violence impacting employment, access to education and healthcare and economic opportunities.

70. Therefore, in my opinion, these reforms are compatible with advancing the inherent rights of First Peoples.

Addressing unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples

71. I note that the reforms may affect the object at section 66(3)(d)(ii) of the Treaty Act by addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation.

72. The amendments to the EO Act would prohibit discrimination based on a person’s subjection to family violence, providing protections and avenues for redress for First Peoples who, as noted above, are disproportionately impacted by family violence. Noting that addressing discrimination can support First Peoples’ employment, economic, health and education opportunities and work to counter the historic and ongoing disadvantage inflicted by colonisation.

73. Therefore, in my view, the reforms to the EO Act are compatible with the object in section 66(3)(d)(ii) of the Treaty Act.

Ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples

74. Noting that family violence has a disproportionate impact on vulnerable communities, particularly First Peoples women, in my view, the reforms are likely, in their practical effect, to have a positive effect on First Peoples and support their equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The reforms will prohibit discrimination on the basis that a person, including First Peoples, has been or is being subjected to family violence in an area of public life, such as employment, education or housing.

75. In addition to the UNDRIP rights detailed above this may promote First Peoples’ human rights, including Victorian Charter rights to the protection of families and children (section 17), taking part in public life (section 18) and peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 16). As these reforms will provide a beneficial legal protection, against discrimination experienced by First Peoples in these areas of public life, they are expected to promote their enjoyment of these rights by preventing a form of discrimination that arises against First Peoples because of their disproportionate experience of family violence.

76. I note that the EO Act contains exceptions and exemptions that permit discrimination on the basis of an attribute protected under the Act, in some circumstances. This would also apply to the new attribute in the Bill. Provisions of the EO Act that would permit discrimination on the basis of a person’s subjection to family violence may disproportionately impact First Peoples, given their overrepresentation as victims of family violence.

77. However, without the Bill, victims of family violence are not protected from discrimination under the EO Act. The limited relevant exceptions and exemptions apply to all attributes protected under the EO Act and were considered by reference to Charter rights when the EO Act was passed in 2010.

78. Some exceptions may also operate to protect and provide tailored services to specific groups. For example, one exception under the EO Act would allow providers to deliver targeted family violence welfare services, such as emergency accommodation for women and/or First Peoples, and limit eligibility of that service to support the welfare and special needs of specific people or groups that are protected under the EO Act. The Bill would extend these recognised attributes to include victims of family violence.

79. Noting that the Bill overall increases protections for victims of family violence, including overrepresented First Peoples, in my opinion it is compatible with the object of ensuring the equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms by First Peoples.

Conclusion

80. For the reasons set out above, in my opinion the Bill is compatible with the objects specified in section 66(3)(d)(i) to (iii) of the Statewide Treaty Act 2025.

Sonya Kilkenny

Attorney General

Minister for Planning

Minister for Prevention of Family Violence