Hansard debates

Ben CARROLL (Niddrie – Premier) (12:08): I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

I ask that my second-reading speech be incorporated into Hansard.

Incorporated speech as follows:

I am pleased to introduce the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Amendment Bill 2026 (Bill). The Bill amends the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011 (IBAC Act) to implement recommendations of the Integrity and Oversight Committee’s (IOC) report into the adequacy of the legislative framework for IBAC to broaden the definition of corrupt conduct and give IBAC the ability to follow the money.

The government has made clear that integrity is not optional. The Bill makes important and immediate amendments to IBAC’s jurisdiction to respond to strong public interest in ensuring public money is spent appropriately. However, the government acknowledges the amendments in the Bill alone will not address all the barriers identified with IBAC’s legislation and the integrity system more broadly.

Victoria’s integrity agencies form part of an interconnected system, and the legislative frameworks that establish their powers, duties and functions interact with one another in various interconnected ways. As such, a change to one agency’s powers and jurisdiction is likely to have for flow-on impacts across the entire integrity system.

That is why the Expert Reference Group, established by the government in response to the IOC’s report, will continue to provide advice on implementing the outstanding recommendations supported by government. The Expert Reference Group will provide this advice to government by May 2027, to inform a second tranche of reforms for introduction in Parliament by the end of 2027.

The government is committed to continuing to work with Victoria’s integrity agencies to ensure their legislation enables them to perform their important accountability and oversight functions.

I will now turn to the substance of the Bill.

Broadening the definition of corrupt conduct

The Bill brings forward implementation of the IOC’s recommendation to lower the threshold of behaviour that meets the definition of corrupt conduct under the IBAC Act, to address the broader limitations with IBAC’s jurisdiction identified by IBAC and the IOC and ensure the Bill gives full effect to the government’s commitment to empower IBAC to consider the unlawful and unethical use of public funds on major infrastructure projects.

Currently under the IBAC Act, conduct must constitute a relevant offence before IBAC can commence an investigation. Relevant offence is currently defined in the IBAC Act as:

• an indictable offence against an Act; or

• any of the common law offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice, bribery of a public official, perverting the course of justice, or misconduct in public office.

Both IBAC and the IOC highlighted that this definition limits IBAC from investigating other integrity-comprising behaviours that do not involve a relevant offence – for example, IBAC cannot investigate serious misconduct in isolation, nor can it examine broader governance or systemic failures unless the conduct meets the threshold for a relevant offence.

To address this issue, the Bill makes amendments to lower the threshold of behaviour that can be considered corrupt conduct, to capture a broader range of criminal conduct and other integrity-compromising behaviour.

The Bill provides that the conduct at subsections 4(1)(a)–(e) amounts to corrupt conduct if it would constitute an offence, or a serious disciplinary matter.

To address feedback that the current definition of relevant offence limits IBAC from considering potential criminal conduct if the conduct does not constitute a statutory indictable offence nor one of the specified common law offences, the Bill removes the requirement that the conduct constitute a relevant offence and replaces this with any criminal offence. This ensures IBAC can consider a broader range of potential criminal conduct, including conduct by associated entities performing public functions.

The new second limb of the definition, ‘serious disciplinary matter’, is defined in the Bill as:

• any serious misconduct; or

• any other matter that constitutes or may constitute grounds for –

• termination of employment, appointment or engagement (whether under contract or otherwise); or

• a significant employment, appointment or contractual penalty or sanction; or

• a serious contravention of various codes of conduct applying to Members of Parliament (MPs), Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and local government councillors.

The inclusion of serious disciplinary matters will broaden IBAC’s jurisdiction to cover a wider range of unethical or integrity-compromising behaviours, even where they do not involve suspected criminal conduct. The new limb also includes specific coverage for serious breaches of certain codes of conduct to ensure elected officials who are not subject to a traditional employment, contractual or appointment relationship are held to the same standard as other public officers.

Importantly, while the amendments will result in a considerable expansion of the nature of conduct that IBAC can consider, the conduct will still need to satisfy the other requirements in section 4 to constitute corrupt conduct. Further, the Bill does not otherwise change the legislative requirement for IBAC to prioritise serious or systemic corrupt conduct – rather, it allows IBAC to consider a broader range of circumstances that may give rise to serious and systemic corrupt conduct.

Empowering IBAC to follow the money

The Bill will also clarify and expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to enable it to investigate allegations of corrupt conduct linked to the use of public funds and publicly funded projects, regardless of whether the funds are expended through public or private entities, where there is a connection between the alleged conduct and government funding.

Currently, corrupt conduct is defined in the IBAC Act with reference to certain types of conduct engaged in by, or affecting, a ‘public officer’ or ‘public body’. The definitions of public officer and public body already encompass any persons or bodies that are performing a public function on behalf of the State or a public officer or public body, including those under contract. However, there is some legislative complexity regarding what constitutes a public function. While the IBAC Act provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered when determining what is a public function, the fact that one or more of these factors are present does not necessarily result in a function being a public function.

IBAC and other stakeholders have raised challenges posed by bodies that deliver both public and non-public functions, noting that determining the extent to which it can investigate alleged conduct involving such a body or its officers, particularly where the allegations relate to both its public and non-public functions, can be difficult in practice.

To give effect to the government’s commitment to empower IBAC to follow the money, the Bill will amend the definitions of public body and public officer in the IBAC Act to include reference to ‘associated entities’, drawing on the definitions in the Audit Act 1994. This will expand IBAC’s jurisdiction to allow IBAC to investigate third party and private contractors where there is a link between the alleged conduct and government funding and give effect to the IOC’s recommendation by adapting VAGO’s information-gathering powers to support IBAC’s investigative role and functions.

Importantly, the amendments in the Bill will not allow IBAC to investigate the mere use of public funds or other substandard, illegal, or unlawful conduct that is unrelated to the performance of public functions.

Consequential minor and technical amendments

The Bill also addresses a secondary issue identified by IBAC in relation to the definition of ‘relevant principal officer’. IBAC identified that the IBAC Act contains a gap as not every ‘public body’ has a corresponding ‘relevant principal officer’. To address this issue, the Bill makes consequential amendments to the definition of relevant principal officer to include the head of an organisation that qualifies as a ‘public body’.

The Bill also makes consequential amendments to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (PID Act) to provide that amendments to include associated entities in the definitions of public officer and public body in the IBAC Act do not apply to the PID Act. This approach is intended to avoid potential flow-on impacts to the PID scheme resulting from the inclusion of associated entity within the definitions of public officer and public body in the IBAC Act (which are adopted in the PID Act), noting the Expert Reference Group will consider broader reform to the PID scheme as part of its report to government.

Transitional provisions

Consistent with the government’s commitment, the reforms will allow IBAC to look at certain conduct that occurred prior to the commencement of the Bill, subject to appropriate limitations.

The Bill includes transitional provisions that will allow IBAC to apply the reforms to conduct that:

• is the subject of a complaint or notification that IBAC received but has not determined to dismiss, investigate or refer before to the commencement of the Bill;

• is the subject of a complaint or notification that IBAC had determined to investigate but had not completed investigating before the commencement of the Bill;

• is the subject of an own motion investigation that IBAC had commenced but had not completed before the commencement of the Bill;

• was not the subject of a complaint or notification to the IBAC that the IBAC had dismissed, referred to another person or body or completed investigating before the commencement of the Bill, or was not the subject of an own motion investigation that IBAC had completed before the Bill’s commencement.

Importantly, the Bill does not enable IBAC to use the reforms to reopen or redetermine matters that it has already considered. The Bill makes minor amendments to ensure the additional criteria and safeguards for IBAC to be able to conduct investigations in relation to conduct which occurred entirely before the Bill commenced. This approach will ensure IBAC is empowered to use its resources effectively and adheres to the legal principle of finality.

Commencement

To ensure IBAC can utilise these important amendments immediately, the Bill provides for commencement on the day after Royal Assent.

However, as IBAC’s jurisdiction will now extend to a wider range of conduct within a broader range of organisations, the Bill delays commencement of mandatory corrupt conduct reporting obligations under section 57 of the IBAC Act for associated entities that come under IBAC’s jurisdiction as result of the Bill for a period of six months from the date of commencement of the Bill.

This approach has been requested by IBAC to provide it time to work with impacted agencies to raise awareness of their new obligations, while ensuring the reforms can otherwise commence in a timely manner.

I am proud to deliver these important reforms the operation of IBAC to strengthen the integrity and accountability of our institutions and the proper use of public funds.

I commend the Bill to the house.