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Legislative Assembly
 
INQUIRIES BILL 2014

21 August 2014
Statement of Compatibility
NAPTHINE

 


                              INQUIRIES BILL 2014
                           Statement of compatibility
Dr NAPTHINE (Premier) tabled following  statement in accordance  with Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006:
  In  accordance  with   section  28  of  the   Charter  of  Human   Rights  and
  Responsibilities   Act   2006   (charter   act),  I  make  this  statement  of
  compatibility with respect to the Inquiries Bill 2014 (bill).
  In  my  opinion,  the bill,  as  introduced to  the  Legislative  Assembly, is
  compatible with human  rights as set out in the charter act. I base my opinion
  on the reasons outlined in this statement.

  Overview
  The primary  purpose  of  the  bill  is  to  provide for the establishment and
  conduct of executive  inquiries in Victoria, and  to make related  amendments.
  Specifically, the bill provides for:
    the  establishment and conduct  of  three types of  executive inquiry: royal
    commissions, boards of inquiry and formal reviews (inquiries);
    powers for each type of inquiry;
    matters  relating  to  privilege,  secrecy  and protection from liability in
    relation to inquiries; and


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offences in relation to inquiries. Human rights issues 1 Human rights protected by the charter act that are relevant to the bill Section 13(a): Privacy Section 13(a) of the charter act provides that a person has the right not to have his or her privacy unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. Powers to obtain evidence The bill provides royal commissions and boards of inquiry with a range of powers to coercively obtain evidence. Both commissions and boards may compel a person to produce a document or thing, to answer questions on oath or affirmation, to attend the inquiry to give evidence and/or produce a document or thing, and have power to inspect, retain and copy documents or things produced. In addition, commissions have power to enter and search premises (under a warrant issued by a magistrate), and to inspect, retain and copy documents or things found. The right to privacy is relevant to these coercive powers, as a person may be required to disclose personal information to the inquiry in a public hearing. This information could also be included in a report of the inquiry. In my opinion, the bill does not limit the right to privacy. Commissions and boards are established to inquire into significant matters of public importance. The ability to compel evidence is necessary to ensure these inquiries are effective and can achieve this important function. These broad powers are limited by the purposes and subject matter of the inquiry, and a person may object to the production of evidence which is not relevant to the inquiry's subject matter. The coercive powers in the bill are subject to limitations and safeguards which protect personal information. Commissions and boards may conduct their inquiries in private, where appropriate, and may exclude persons from inquiry proceedings and prevent the disclosure or publication of evidence. The execution of a search warrant is subject to procedural safeguards, including announcement and notification requirements. In addition, the bill includes confidentiality provisions and offences which ensure that evidence cannot be taken advantage of or inappropriately used or disclosed. Disclosure of information The bill provides that an inquiry may disclose information or provide documents to another person or body where the disclosing person considers that: the information or document is relevant to the performance of the functions of the person or body to whom it is given; and it is appropriate to disclose the information or to give the document. While this provision allows for the disclosure of personal information, it ensures that inquiries have flexibility to share important information with other relevant persons and bodies (e.g. police, prosecutors or integrity bodies) where appropriate. Section 13(b): Reputation Section 13(b) of the charter act provides that a person has the right not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked. The bill requires royal commissions, boards of inquiry and formal reviews to report on their inquiry. These reports may be tabled in Parliament. The right to reputation is relevant, as reports may include adverse findings about individuals. However, the bill ensures that reputations are not unlawfully or arbitrarily damaged, by providing that an inquiry (a) must adhere to the requirements of procedural fairness, (b) cannot make a finding that is adverse to a person unless satisfied that the person has been given an opportunity to respond to that finding, and (c) must consider and fairly set out in its report any such response. Section 20: Property Section 20 of the charter act provides that a person must not be deprived of his or her property other than in accordance with law. The right requires search and seizure powers to be clear, confined, formulated precisely, and accessible to the public. As outlined above, royal commission officers may inspect, retain and copy relevant documents and things found in the execution of a search warrant. The bill clearly sets out the scope and operation of this power, including the circumstances in which property may be seized. The occupier of the relevant premises must be provided with receipts for any seized items, as well as copies of any seized documents or things (where a copy can be readily made) as soon as practicable, unless contrary to the public interest. Seized property must also be returned if the retention is no longer necessary for the purposes of an inquiry or if the property is required as evidence in a legal proceeding. Any interference with the right to property is strictly confined, and does not limit this right. Section 24(1): Fair hearing Section 24(1) of the charter act provides that a person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing. In my view, the right to a fair hearing does not apply to inquiries established under the bill. These inquiries will not constitute a 'tribunal' for the purposes of the charter act. Further, examinations by inquiries will not constitute civil or criminal proceedings, as they do not possess the key features inherent to these proceedings (e.g. determining issues between parties in a binding way, such as by finding fault and imposing penalties). Notwithstanding this conclusion, I note that the bill includes a range of general protections which promote fairness for participants in inquiry proceedings. For example, inquiries must comply with the requirements of procedural fairness, a person may be allowed to be legally represented, and must be given an opportunity to respond to any proposed adverse findings.
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Section 15(2): Freedom of expression Section 15(2) of the charter act provides that every person has the right to freedom of expression. This includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. The right may be subject to lawful restrictions reasonably necessary to respect the rights of other persons or for the protection of national security, public order, public health or public morality. Restrictions on publication As noted above, inquiries may make an order to prevent the publication of information or evidence given to it. This allows an inquiry to protect sensitive information and thereby protect the privacy of individuals and public order. As such, the right is not limited. Exemption from Freedom of Information Act 1982 The bill provides that the Freedom of Information Act 1982 does not apply to any document in the possession of an inquiry, or to certain documents in the possession of any other person or body during the existence of an inquiry. This exemption is aimed at protecting the integrity of the inquiry process during the life of the inquiry, and is appropriate given the sensitivity of the information that inquiries will handle. It ensures inquiries can operate effectively and without the danger that sensitive material will be publicly released. As such, I consider that the exemption does not limit the right to expression. Section 25(1): Presumption of innocence Section 25(1) of the charter act provides that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The bill creates criminal offences in relation to a person's participation in inquiries. Several of these offences shift the burden of proof from the prosecution to the accused. As such, the right to be presumed innocent is relevant. A number of offences include a 'reasonable excuse' exception. In my view, these offences place an evidentiary burden on the accused, but they do not transfer the legal burden of proof. This is because, once the defendant has pointed to evidence of a reasonable excuse, the burden will shift to the prosecution to prove the absence of the exception or defence raised. Courts in other jurisdictions have generally taken the approach that an evidential onus on a defendant to raise a defence does not limit the presumption of innocence. For these reasons, I consider that the placing of an evidentiary burden on a defendant does not constitute a limit on the right in s 25(1). Further, even if this were found to limit the right, the limitation would be reasonable and justifiable under section 7(2) of the charter act. Section 12: Freedom of movement Section 12 of the charter act provides that every person lawfully within Victoria has the right to move freely within Victoria. As outlined above, the bill permits a commission or board to compel the attendance of persons at a hearing. The right to freedom of movement is relevant to the extent that a person may be required to attend at a particular place and time. However, I consider that any interference is minor and lawful. As a result, the right is not limited. Section 17(2): Best interests of the child Section 17(2) of the charter act provides that every child has the right, without discrimination, to such protection as is in his or her best interests and is needed by him or her by reason of being a child. This right is relevant to the extent that the bill allows coercive powers (outlined above) to be exercised with respect to persons under 18 years of age. The bill provides that such powers must be exercised subject to the requirements of procedural fairness. It also provides for commissions and Boards to take account of the age of a child when determining whether to allow them to participate in, or be legally represented at, an inquiry. I am satisfied that these requirements ensure the best interests of children are considered by inquiries and, as such, this right is not limited. 2 Human rights that are limited by the bill Section 25(2)(k): Protection against self-incrimination Section 25(2)(k) of the charter act provides that a person who has been charged with a criminal offence has the right not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt. This is also an aspect of the right to a fair trial protected by section 24. As explained above, inquiries established under the bill will not constitute civil or criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, this right is relevant to clauses of the bill relating to the subsequent use of evidence given to inquiries. The bill partially abrogates the privilege against self-incrimination for royal commission inquiries. It provides that it is not a reasonable excuse for a person to fail to comply with a requirement to provide information on the basis that it might tend to incriminate the person or make him or her liable to a penalty, except in relation to proceedings that have been commenced against the person but not finally been disposed of. The privilege against self-incrimination is only abrogated for commissions, which will investigate matters of the greatest public importance and, therefore, require access to the broadest suite of evidence gathering powers. The abrogation of this privilege is balanced by a use immunity, which ensures material given to a commission by a person is inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings against that person (with limited exceptions, discussed below). The immunity: extends to information, answers, documents and things (although, as discussed below, documents are treated differently from other materials in certain respects); applies directly to all materials obtained by a commission, whether by compulsion or voluntarily, including material obtained as a result of an abrogation of privilege. In the case of self-incriminating material, the Supreme Court has held that similar immunity
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provisions extend to other evidence obtained as a direct result of such materials; and applies in all subsequent criminal, civil, administrative proceedings before a court or tribunal or any disciplinary proceedings. There are limited exceptions to this use immunity, which allow materials to be used in a proceeding for an offence under the bill or for perjury or destruction of evidence under the Crimes Act 1958. Documents may also be used where they are, or could have been, obtained independently of their production to the commission, either before or after that production. This ensures authorities are not prevented from making use of documents that have, or could have, been obtained independently of a royal commission's inquiry. While the bill limits the protection against self-incrimination, I consider that this limitation is reasonable and justified. The privilege against self-incrimination is abrogated only in a royal commission proceeding, and continues to apply in respect of any proceedings against a person which remain on foot. Additionally, the use immunity ensures self-incriminating evidence will be inadmissible against a person in subsequent proceedings in most circumstances. Where materials are capable of being admitted in subsequent proceedings, this would be a matter for the relevant court or tribunal to determine, based on the rules of evidence and having regard to other considerations including the circumstances of the production of the evidence to the commission. The measures outlined above limit any possible disadvantage to a person who is required to give self-incriminating evidence to a royal commission. To the extent that the bill allows such evidence to be used against a person in subsequent proceedings, I consider that this is reasonable and justified. The bill seeks to balance the need for authorities to use relevant evidence to which they would otherwise be entitled; the need for commissions to access the materials needed to undertake an effective inquiry; and the need to protect the rights of individuals who provide self-incriminating evidence. I consider that there is no less restrictive means available to ensure this balance. The Hon. Dr Denis Napthine, MP Premier